As we have explained, however, reapportionment legislation that cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to classify and separate voters by race injures voters in other ways. 8The black plaintiffs in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), I am confident, would have suffered equally had whites in Tuskegee sought to maintain their control by annexing predominantly white suburbs, rather than splitting the municipality in two. An understanding of the nature of appellants' claim is critical to our resolution of the case. US attorney general rejected a North Carolina congressional reappointment plan because the plan created only one black majority district, 1. The General Assembly located the second district not in the south-central to southeastern part of the State, but in the north-central region along Interstate 85. 3 The majority does not acknowledge that we require such a showing from plaintiffs who bring a vote dilution claim under 2 of the Voting Rights Act. I respectfully dissent. Id., at 357 (internal quotation marks omitted). Suppose a person who buys only wine and cheese is See Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. 25, 40-41 (1993) ("Unless these points are established, there neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy"). Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. The States certainly have a very strong interest in complying with federal antidiscrimination laws that are constitutionally valid as interpreted and as applied. Supp., at 476-477 (Voorhees, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Its central purpose is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race. They threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility. Supp., at 468-469. The case established that any legislative redistricting must be strictly scrutinized and that any laws related to racially motivated redistricting must be held to narrow standards and If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District Court further must determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. These principles apply not only to legislation that contains explicit racial distinctions, but also to those "rare" statutes that, although race neutral, are, on their face, "unexplainable on grounds other than race." Wygant, supra, at 295 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). The dissenters consider the circumstances of this case "functionally indistinguishable" from multimember districting and at-large voting systems, which are loosely described as "other varieties of gerrymandering." Freedom of Speech, Assembly, and Association. Supp., at 467. In its 1993 decision, the Supreme Court agreed, ruling that race cannot be the predominant factor in creating districts. Respondent Argument (Reno) 1. See Brief for Republican National Committee as Amicus Curiae 14-15. SHAW ET AL. 392 (WDNC), and this Court summarily affirmed, 506 U. S. 801 (1992). These unarguable facts, which the Court devotes most of its opinion to proving, give rise to three constitutional questions: Does the Constitution impose a requirement of contiguity or compactness on how the States may draw their electoral districts? Because the holding is limited to such anomalous circumstances, ante, at 649, it perhaps will not substantially hamper a State's legitimate efforts to redistrict in favor of racial minorities. In the lower court record, the district was said to resemble a Rorschach ink-blot test, and theWall Street Journalclaimed the district looked like a "bug splattered on a windshield." the group claimed that the districts were racial gerrymanders that violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. of Oral Arg. The Act proved immediately successful in ensuring racial minorities access to the voting booth; by the early 1970's, the spread between black and white registration in several of the targeted Southern States had fallen to well below 10%. Following is the case brief for Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) Case Summary of Shaw v. Reno: The State of North Carolina, in response to the U.S. Attorney General's objection that it had only one majority-black congressional district, created a second majority-black district. At least. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 272 (1979). H. Lefler & A. Newsom, The History of a Southern State: North Carolina 18-22 (3d ed. See, e. g., Croson, supra, at 509 (plurality opinion). Drawing on the "one person, one vote" principle, this Court recognized that "[t]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.". What is the purpose of an input device? See, e. g., Croson, 488 U. S., at 491-493 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, J. whether appellants' complaint stated a claim under constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment. to Juris. In 1993, about 20% of the state population identified as Black. That argument strikes a powerful historical chord: It is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past. This will be true in areas where the minority population is geographically dispersed. districts in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act. in M1 and M2? 653-657. 4 The Court's opinion suggests that African-Americans may now be the only group to which it is unconstitutional to offer specific benefits from redistricting. The voting age population of North Carolina is approximately 78% white, 20% black, and 1% Native American; the remaining 1% is predominantly Asian. Id., at 472-473. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. That racial bloc voting or minority political cohesion may be found to exist in some cases, of course, is no reason to treat all racial gerrymanders differently from other kinds of racial classification. Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. Our focus is on appellants' claim that the State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. In whatever district, the individual voter has a right to vote in each election, and the election will result in the voter's representation. (1986) (teacher layoffs), electoral districting calls for decisions that nearly always require some consideration of race for legitimate reasons where there is a racially mixed population. Research* indicates that the body temperature T(t)T(t)T(t) (in C{ }^{\circ} \mathrm{C}C ) of patients with Alzheimer's disease fluctuates periodically over a 24-hour period according to the formula, T(t)=37.29+0.46cos[(t16.37)12]T(t)=37.29+0.46 \cos \left[\frac{\pi(t-16.37)}{12}\right] The ruling was significant in the area of redistricting and racial gerrymandering. The duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group. When a newly created district cannot be explained by means other than race, it is subject to strict scrutiny. See ante, at 642-643. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters-a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. Moreover, a group's power to affect the political process does not automatically dissipate by virtue of an electoral loss. Might the consumer be better off with $2,000\$2,000$2,000 in income? It is also unnecessary to decide at this stage of the litigation whether the plan advances a state interest distinct from the Act: eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination. When an assumption that people in a particular minority group (whether they are defined by the political party, religion, ethnic group, or race to which they belong) will vote in a particular way is used to benefit that group, no constitutional violation occurs. For much of our Nation's history, that right sadly has been denied to many because of race. Its central purpose is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race. Indeed, the facts of the case would not have supported such a claim. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469,494 (plurality opinion). Dissenting Opinion. Ibid. 16-19. I join JUSTICE WHITE'S dissenting opinion. What is the NPV of the new plant? United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 161-162 (1977) (UJO) (pluralityopinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ. Where was the Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied? cases of electoral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions. More importantly, the majority's submission does not withstand analysis. They were the first blacks to represent North Carolina, a state with a 20 percent black population, since 1901. See, e. g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474, 484, n. 2 (1990) ("[A] prosecutor's assumption that a black juror may be presumed to be partial simply because he is black violates the Equal Protection. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 304-305 (1978) (Powell, J.) Pp. This is the reason that the placement of given voters in a given district, even on the basis of race, does not, without more, diminish the effectiveness of the individual as a voter. They also stated: "'Our argument is that the history of the area demonstrates that there could be-and in fact was-no reason other than race to divide the community at this time.'" In the 17th, 19th, and 20th Districts, whites constituted respectively 94.9%, 71.5%, and 72.5% of the population. The Twelfth District received even harsher criticism. Finally, like New York, North Carolina reacted by modifying its plan and creating additional majority-minority districts. Ruth Shaw and four other white North Carolina voters filed suit against the U.S. attorney general and various North Carolina officials, claiming that race-based redistricting violated, among other provisions, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. of Cal. See, e. g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339,341. 649-652. For discussion of the substance of these opinions, see infra text accompanying notes 53-74. Second, JUSTICE STEVENS argues that racial gerrymandering poses no constitutional difficulties when district lines are drawn to favor the minority, rather than the majority. But it soon became apparent that guaranteeing equal access to the polls would not suffice to root out other racially discriminatory voting practices. Id., at 179 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). The Court offers them no explanation of this paradox. After the Attorney General of the United States objected to the plan pursuant to 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. The Court appears to accept this, and it does not purport to disturb the law of vote dilution in any way. income. In response, the state legislature revised the plan in a way that created two districts (the First and the Twelfth) that would have a majority of black voters. 2 It should be noted that 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids any State to impose specified devices or procedures that result in a denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race or color. Accordingly, they held that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. Our voting rights precedents support that conclusion. See id., at 55,58. Katzenbach, Michael R. Cole, Alan E. Kraus, Laughlin McDonald, Kathy Wilde, E. Richard Larson, and Dennis Courtland Hayes; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., by Elaine R. Jones, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Dayna L. Cunningham; and for Bolley Johnson et al. Appellants alleged not that the revised plan constituted a political gerrymander, nor that it violated the "one person, one vote" principle, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 558 (1964), but that the State had created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Rather, the issue is whether the classification based on race discriminates. But it suffices to illustrate the unworkability of a standard that is divorced from any measure of constitutional harm. Shaw appealed. The Court held that although North Carolina's reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its face, the resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts based on race. ", ity voters-surely they cannot complain of discriminatory treatment.6. (b) Classifications of citizens based solely on race are by their nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality, because they threaten to stigmatize persons by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility. Ruth O. Shaw, a North Carolina resident who led a group of white voters in the lawsuit, Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas. That claim, the majority concluded, was barred by United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO). Allen v. State Bd. In the 1870's, for example, opponents of Reconstruction in Mississippi "concentrated the bulk of the black population in a 'shoestring' Congressional district running the length of the Mississippi River, leaving five others with white majorities." Yes; the Court agreed that the shape of the proposed district was so odd that there was no compelling explanation for its shape other than separating voters by race. In the absence of an allegation of such harm, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court. It is currently at its target debtequity ratio of .60. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Our focus is on appellants' claim that the State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. 808 F. Redistricting legislation that is alleged to be so bizarre on its face that it is unexplainable on grounds other than race demands the same close scrutiny, regardless of the motivations underlying its adoption. As the majority recognizes, "redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors." 9 As has been remarked, "[d]ragons, bacon strips, dumbbells and other strained shapes are not always reliable signs that partisan (or racial or ethnic or factional) interests are being served, while the most regularly drawn district may turn out to have been skillfully constructed with an intent to aid one party." Appellants are five residents of Dur-. On the same reasoning, I would affirm the District Court's dismissal of appellants' claim in this instance. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 291 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 12(b)(6). For these reasons, we conclude that a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. The Court's opinion essentially calls into question the validity of the entire makeup of the House of Representatives because in most of the States there was a significant difference in the populations of their congressional districts. That duty, however, is not violated when the majority acts to facilitate the election of a member of a group that lacks such power because it remains underrepresented in the state legislature - whether that group is defined by political affiliation, by common economic interests, or by religious, ethnic, or racial characteristics. It may be that the terms for pleading this cause of action will be met so rarely that this case will wind up an aberra-. See, e. g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. can imagine would be the preservation of "sound districting principles," UJO, 430 U. S., at 168, such as compactness and contiguity. The plaintiffs alleged that the statute excluded nonwhites from one district and concentrated them in the other three. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347; cf. As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina gained one congressional seat, increasing its House membership to twelve and requiring the state legislature to redraw the state's congressional districts. There is thus no theoretical inconsistency in having two distinct approaches to equal protection analysis, one for cases of electoral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions. Section 2 also provides that a violation of that prohibition "is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected] class in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." See, e.g.,Rogers v. Lodge(1982);White v. Regester(1973). It may therefore be that few electoral districting cases are ever likely to employ the strict scrutiny the Court holds to be applicable on remand if appellants' allegations are "not contradicted." One state legislator has remarked that" '[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district.'" Pp. Appellants' racial gerrymandering claims must be examined against the backdrop of this country's long history of racial discrimination in voting. See supra, at 642-643. 1994), probable jurisdiction noted 115 . 339." An understanding of the nature of appellants' claim is critical to our resolution of the case. It was a function of the type of injury upon which the Court insisted. See ante, at 652 (acknowledging that "UJO set forth a standard under which white voters can establish unconstitutional vote dilution"). Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. 15, 1. Race in redistricting is permissible as long as configurations are not too extreme, Christina Dejong, Christopher E. Smith, George F Cole, Government in America: Elections and Updates Edition, George C. Edwards III, Martin P. Wattenberg, Robert L. Lineberry. no further than the Voting Rights Act to understand that this may be required, and we have held that race may constitutionally be taken into account in order to comply with that Act. Evidence of the district's shape is therefore convincing, but it is also cumulative, and, for our purposes, irrelevant. UJO, supra, at 151-152. See Tr. 21A375 is treated as a . Photochronograph Corporation (PC) manufactures time series photographic equipment. JUSTICE WHITE WITH WHOM JUSTICE BLACKMUN AND JUSTICE STEVENS JOIN, DISSENTING. The Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO. Nonetheless, the notion that North Carolina's plan, under which whites remain a voting majority in a disproportionate number of congressional districts, and pursuant to which the State has sent its first black representatives since Reconstruction to the United States Congress, might have violated appellants' constitutional rights is both a fiction and a departure from settled equal protection principles. Is it more "narrowly tailored" to create an irregular majority-minority district as opposed to one that is compact but harms other state interests such as incumbency protection or the representation of rural interests? Proc. As long as members of racial groups have the commonality of interest implicit in our ability to talk about concepts like <"minority voting strength," and "dilution of minority votes," cf.Thornburg v. Gingles(1986), and as long as racial bloc voting takes place, legislators will have to take race into account in order to avoid dilution of minority voting strength in the districting plans they adopt. Id., at 139. Accordingly, they held that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under the Constitution's, NORTH CAROLINA CONGRESSIONAL PLAN Chapter 7 of the 1991 Session Laws (1991 Extra Session). Since I have already written at length about these questions,l my negative answer to each can be briefly explained. 92-357 . Pp. What appellants object to is redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification. UJO concerned New York's revision of a reapportionment plan to include additional majority-minority districts in response to the Attorney General's denial of administrative preclearance under 5. The grounds for my disagreement with the majority are simply stated: Appellants have not presented a cognizable claim, because they have not alleged a cognizable injury. ); see also post, at 662-663 (opinion of WHITE, J.). Because the State's purpose here was to comply with the Voting Rights Act, and because the General Assembly's plan did not lead to proportional underrepresentation of white voters state-. Shaw v. Reno. In 1991, a group of white voters in North Carolina challenged the state's new congressional district map, which had two "majority-minority" districts. To begin with, the complaint nowhere alleges any type of stigmatic harm. -dividing voters into districts bc of race is segregation. The General Assembly's first redistricting plan contained one majority-black district centered in that area of the State. Id., at 477. 430 U. S., at 165. Unlike other contexts in which we have addressed the State's conscious use of race, see, e. g., Richmond v. J. They alleged that the General Assembly deliberately "create[d] two Congressional Districts in which a majority of black voters was concentrated arbitrarily-without regard to any other considerations, such as compactness, contiguousness, geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions" with the purpose "to create Congressional Districts along racial lines" and to assure the election of two black representatives to Congress. The other part of the majority's explanation of its holding is related to its simultaneous discomfort and fascination with irregularly shaped districts. Some 90 years later, Alabama redefined the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee "from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure" in a manner that was alleged to exclude black voters, and only black voters, from the city limits. Disregard for geographic divisions and compactness often goes hand in hand with partisan gerrymandering. It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. V. United States, 238 U. S. 256, 272 ( 1979 ) the protection., see, e. g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. (... Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 ; Guinn v. United States, 425 U. 256... Majority-Minority districts partisan gerrymandering Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO appears to this... Rights Act appears to accept this, and this Court summarily affirmed, U.! 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